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INTRODUCTION
The charitable deduction has enjoyed relatively little support in the
legal academy. Many commentators have asked what it adds to the
tax system and, as critics such as Stanley Surrey and Paul McDaniel
have observed, the deduction obviously does not itself collect tax rev-
enue.1 Defenders respond that the deduction helps to measure in-
come and to keep taxpayers from inefficiently substituting leisure for
1 Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 205 & n.32 (1985); Paul R.
McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the
Income Tax Deduction, 27 Tax L. Rev. 377, 390 (1972).
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work, but these points are, of course, contested.2 Instead of revisiting
debates about what the deduction adds to the tax system, this Article
focuses on the broader question of what it adds to the pursuit of pub-
lic goals. The deduction-and any other government subsidy that
matches charitable contributions through the tax system (here called
"subsidized charity")-enlists private individuals to pursue public
goals in a somewhat unique manner. While in other settings the gov-
ernment delegates implementation but still specifies the goal to be
pursued,3 charitable donors are allowed to select the goal as well. 4 Is
it desirable to pursue public goals in this way?5
This is very much a live controversy since President Barack Obama
recently proposed to scale back the deduction for charitable contribu-
tions (as well as other itemized deductions) as a way to raise revenue. 6
2 William Andrews argues that money the taxpayer gives away, and thus does not con-
sume, should not be considered her income. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in
an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 314-15, 346 (1972). In response, Mark Kelman
argues that giving money away is something a taxpayer chooses to do, so this money should
be considered her income. Mark Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit
Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31
Stan. L. Rev. 831, 833-34 (1979); see also Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax
Deductions or Matching Grants? 28 Tax L. Rev. 37, 59-60 (1972) (noting that charitable
deduction is needed to create parity in tax treatment of those who donate money and those
who donate time); Peter Diamond, Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contributions for
Public Goods with and Without Warm Glow Preferences, 90 J. Pub. Econ. 897, 901 (2006)
(arguing that charitable deduction allows marginal rates to be higher by keeping taxpayers
from substituting leisure for work).
3 Examples include government contracting (for example, to build a new weapons sys-
tem), regulation (for example, to reduce pollutants), or targeted tax benefits (for example,
to promote education).
4 Donors can choose from a very broad range of public goals. "The exempt purposes set
forth in section 501(c)(3) are charitable, religious, educational, scientific, literary, testing
for public safety, fostering national or international amateur sports competition, and
preventing cruelty to children or animals. The term charitable is used in its generally ac-
cepted legal sense and includes relief of the poor, the distressed, or the underprivileged;
advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erecting or maintaining
public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening the burdens of government; lessening
neighborhood tensions; eliminating prejudice and discrimination; defending human and
civil rights secured by law; and combating community deterioration and juvenile delin-
quency." IRS, Exempt Purposes-Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), Jan. 5, 2009,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=175418,00.html.
5 The literature focuses on public goods such as clean air, which are undersupplied be-
cause they can be enjoyed even by those who do not pay for them. But this Article uses
the broader phrase "public goals" because other market failures require government inter-
vention as well-to redistribute wealth, operate natural monopolies, and address imbal-
ances in information, among others.
6 President Obama has proposed limiting the deduction so that donors can reduce their
taxes by at most twenty-eight cents for every dollar that they contribute, even if their mar-
ginal tax rate is higher than 28%. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 2010, Jumpstarting the Economy and Investing for
the Future 29 (2009) ("The Administration's Budget includes a proposal to limit the tax
rate at which high-income taxpayers can take itemized deductions to 28 percent...").
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In response, this Article analyzes three justifications for the deduc-
tion, each responding to a different information or incentive problem
that is inherent in the pursuit of public goals. First, the subsidy can
counter free riding by encouraging donors to be more generous. This
goal is familiar,7 but novel applications are explored here. A second
objective is to measure and respond to popular preferences about
public goals. Subsidized charity can encourage experimentation and
competition and can empower minority perspectives that are under-
represented in the political process. Yet subsidized charity also dis-
proportionately represents the views of wealthy donors. While this
Article draws on prior work in delineating these competing considera-
tions,8 the analysis here offers new insights and institutional design
responses. The third goal is to recruit private donors to monitor the
quality of nonprofits, so that the government can piggyback on these
quality-control efforts. This goal is new to the literature, as are the
institutional design alternatives offered to enhance it.
Since there are three competing rationales for the subsidy, its insti-
tutional design can vary depending upon which has priority-a ten-
sion that, to my knowledge, is new to the literature. To encourage
generosity, the subsidy should focus on wealthy donors, giving them
broad discretion about which causes to support and targeting marginal
contributions. Recruiting these wealthy donors as monitors is largely
compatible with this program. Yet by focusing on wealthy donors, the
subsidy may fail to reflect broad popular preferences. In response,
one option is to compensate with other policy instruments, such as
government programs, to address the preferences of low-income
nondonors. While I find this approach appealing, others reasonably
could want subsidized charity itself to be more representative. To-
ward that end, we could go to extra lengths to persuade low-income
7 See Mark Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 Va. L. Rev.
1393, 1398-406 (1988) (justifying charitable deduction in part as response to free riding);
Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 Tenn.
L. Rev. 687, 747 (1999). There is also a burgeoning economics literature on why individu-
als give to charity, and whether a charitable subsidy will increase or decrease private giv-
ing. See generally James Andreoni, Philanthropy, in Handbook of the Economics of
Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity 1201, 1230-48 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier
Ythier eds., 2006) (surveying literature), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
handbooks/15740714 (follow "Chapter 18 Philanthropy" hyperlink; then follow "PDF (664
K)" hyperlink); Gerald F. Auten, Charles T. Clotfelter & Richard L. Schmalbeck, Taxes
and Philanthropy Among the Wealthy, in Does Atlas Shrug? 392, 414-17 (Joel B. Slemrod
ed., 2000).
8 See Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 387 (1998) (defending charita-
ble deduction as a way to circumvent public choice problems that arise when the govern-
ment allocates funding); Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit
Sector in a Three Sector Economy, in The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions 21, 30-31
(Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986) (defending charitable deduction as empowering minori-
ties to pursue public goals that majoritarian political processes would not endorse).
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taxpayers to contribute more (for example, through extra-generous
matches) or, for that matter, to induce wealthy donors to contribute
less (for example, through caps on giving) or to support causes that
reflect broad popular consensus (for example, through limits on which
causes are subsidized). Yet the cost of making the subsidy more rep-
resentative in this way is that it will be less effective at advancing the
other goals of encouraging generosity and recruiting monitors.
Part II offers a justification for subsidizing charity, rooted in
problems of information and incentives. Part III considers the goal of
encouraging generosity and institutional design alternatives for doing
so. Part IV explores the goal of representing preferences, as well as
associated tradeoffs and institutional design alternatives. Part V ana-
lyzes the goal of recruiting private monitors, as well as the tradeoffs
and institutional design options it involves. Part VI is the conclusion. 9
II. THE EXTERNALITIES OF GIVING AND THE CHALLENGES OF
INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES
It is well understood that contributions to charity generate positive
externalities that justify a commitment of public resources. Yet it does
not necessarily follow that subsidized charity is the best means to de-
liver these public resources, instead of alternatives such as tax-sup-
ported government programs. If a cause is worthwhile, why shouldn't
the government simply pursue it directly? Why use subsidized char-
ity? This Part previews three reasons, each of which addresses
problems of information and incentives that burden competing policy
alternatives.
A. Externalities of Charitable Giving
Gifts of all sorts-not just charitable gifts-generate positive exter-
nalities.10 For instance, if a grandmother gives her grandson $1000,
the grandson will enjoy spending this money, and the grandmother
derives separate satisfaction from this gift. Feelings of altruism induce
the grandmother to be happy whenever her grandson is happy. This is
true whether or not the grandmother is the cause of this happiness;
indeed, if her grandson finds the cash in the street, an altruistic grand-
9 Given the breadth of this topic, a number of issues are not considered. There is no
discussion of in kind giving or split-interest giving, and only passing reference (mostly in
footnotes) to the gift and estate taxes, special issues associated with foundations, the tax
exemption of nonprofits, and the question of what qualifies as a public goal (and thus the
boundary between nonprofits and for-profit firms).
10 See Louis Kaplow, Tax Policy and Gifts, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 283, 284
(1998); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. Pub. Econ. 469, 469-70 (1995)
(discussing double utility associated with gifts).
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mother still feels joy in her grandson's good fortune. In addition, the
grandmother may feel additional satisfaction from knowing that she is
the one who made this gift, a sensation separate from altruism that
economists call "warm glow."'"
In deciding whether to make a gift, the grandmother undercounts
the utility it generates. The problem, as Louis Kaplow has shown, is
that she does not fully account for her grandson's utility.12 His happi-
ness should be double counted since it makes two people happy (both
the grandmother and grandson), but instead his happiness is counted
only once (just through the grandmother's feelings about his happi-
ness). Thus, gifts generate positive externalities, since the donor does
not fully account for the donee's utility when making a gift.
A charitable gift is like any other gift in this respect, as Kaplow has
emphasized. 13 In addition, charitable gifts present other welfare bene-
fits. First, they are likely to support public goods, so this means that
the cause being funded is broadly valued. Not only do the donor and
the donee derive utility, but also free riders who are pleased to know
that a cause they value is being supported, even if they do not support
it themselves. Second, charitable gifts often involve redistribution,
which enhances welfare since donees tend to be less wealthy than do-
nors and thus have greater need for the money. Third, donors derive
satisfaction in contributing labor, as well as money, and sometimes
find community and recognition through the nonprofits they
support. 14
On the other side of the ledger, charitable giving can lead to welfare
losses as well. Donor motivations are complex and in some cases the
satisfaction from giving is limited. Peter Diamond and James Andre-
oni offer the example of someone who gives to an aggressive panhan-
dler in order to end the unpleasantness of the solicitation.' 5 Yet I
suspect this motivation is unusual in other settings, if only because
there are painless ways to refuse a solicitation. It is perfectly easy to
explain that one has other commitments, leaving no capacity for an-
other gift even to a worthy cause. Indeed, sometimes people derive
perverse satisfaction from refusing a solicitation, using the opportu-
11 E.g., Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Finance 261 (2007).
12 Id. at 253.
13 Id. at 270-74.
14 For example, religious institutions continue to be hubs of communal life for many
people. Especially among wealthy people, boards and social activities of museums, educa-
tional institutions, and hospitals offer a social network and a sense of community.
15 Diamond, note 2, at 909; Andreoni, note 7, at 1225.
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nity to articulate reservations about the cause. 16 Even so, Diamond
and Andreoni's critique reminds us of the need to consider context.17
Donees and free riders may experience welfare losses as well. Al-
though receiving a gift generally makes donees better off, they may
feel some resentment, and also may become less motivated to work.18
Again context is important, though, since some gifts may actually en-
hance the donee's ability to work, such as charitable support for edu-
cation or health care. The reactions of free riders also can prove
complex. While they may be pleased that a cause they value is at-
tracting support, as noted above, they may also envy the recognition
the donor receives for the gift.19
The net of these various effects determines which social investments
give rise to the greatest positive externalities, and thus justify a com-
mitment of the most resources. As a normative baseline, welfarists
generally want each public goal to be supported to the extent that it is
valued, in the aggregate, by individual members of society. This "Lin-
dahl solution," as it is called, simulates what the market would supply
in the absence of market failure.20 Although this Article generally
uses the Lindahl result as the baseline, other baselines obviously are
plausible as well, such as a Rawlsian approach that favors the prefer-
ences of the least well off.21
B. Why Rely on Subsidized Charity Instead of Alternatives?
The Lindahl solution (and any other baseline) can be pursued
through various institutional arrangements, including government reg-
ulation, government programs (whether at the federal, state, or local
level), government grants to for-profit firms and nonprofits, targeted
tax credits for specific public goals, and the like. Why, then, should
we rely on subsidized charity?
To answer this question, we should determine which approach is
more efficient and more equitable. Which is less likely to be resisted
16 It may be more difficult to say "no" to friends, but if there is an implicit quid pro
quo-we give to a friend's charity, and in return they give to ours-then we are really
making an indirect contribution to our own preferred cause.
17 Diamond and Andreoni go further, suggesting almost as a matter of principle that it is
never appropriate to factor a donor's "warm glow" in the social welfare function. See
Diamond, note 2, at 915-17; Andreoni, note 7, at 1224-27. But this goes too far. Obvi-
ously, many donors derive great joy from their donation, and this satisfaction should not be
dismissed as irrelevant.
18 Kaplow, note 11, at 254.
19 Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka, A Case for Taxing Charitable Donations, 91 J. Pub.
Econ. 1555, 1556, 1563 (2007).
20 For a discussion of the Lindahl solution or benefit pricing, see Gergen, note 7, at
1400-01.
21 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 75 (1971).
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by potential funders, so that they will not change their behavior in
inefficient ways? Which generates lower administrative costs? Which
allocates money more reliably to high-value public goals? Another
important set of questions asks which approach is more consistent
with our distributional goals and our notions of democratic legitimacy.
To make these judgments, we need to look for notable differences
between subsidized charity and its alternatives. Yet as an initial mat-
ter, it is worth emphasizing that, at least in theory, the differences may
be quite limited. In a hypothetical world of perfect information and
incentives, at least, government programs and nonprofits should yield
the same results (as, indeed, would the market). After all, the deci-
sion of how much of the economy to devote to public goals is made by
the same people-whether individually as donors or consumers or col-
lectively as taxpayers-and, in a world of perfect information and in-
centives, the decision ought to be the same in either setting. Likewise,
these same people decide which goals to support, and in this idealized
environment the institutional context should not affect this choice.
Either their government representative will accurately assess collec-
tive sentiment and will faithfully translate it into the relevant pro-
grams, or individuals will band together on their own to pursue the
same goals. Finally, the implementation of these public goals should
be of equal quality-whether conducted by government or private
employees-because, by assumption, each workforce is perfectly in-
formed and motivated.
The goal of this thought experiment is not to prove that it is irrele-
vant whether we use subsidized charity or an alternative. On the con-
trary, in the spirit of Coase and Modigliani and Miller,22 the goal is to
show why this institutional design choice really does matter by show-
ing how unrealistic the premises have to be in order for it not to mat-
ter. If we need to make heroic assumptions about information and
incentives in order to render institutional design unimportant, then we
know that information and incentives have to be a central preoccupa-
tion in determining whether to rely on subsidized charity.
C. Information, Incentives, and the Case for Subsidized Charity
Indeed, information and incentives lie at the heart of three chal-
lenges that arise in pursuing public goals, whether through subsidized
22 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960) (argu-
ing that legal rules would not matter in a world with no transaction costs because parties
would bargain around the rules); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capi-
tal, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261 (1958)
(arguing that capital structure would not matter in a world of perfect information and no
transactions costs).
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charity or in other ways: securing funding, allocating this funding
among competing public priorities, and monitoring quality. A subsidy
for charitable contributions has unique advantages in addressing these
challenges. Yet there are disadvantages too, as well as tensions among
the three goals, such that institutional design is important in managing
tradeoffs.
1. Encouraging Generosity
The first goal is to raise money. The familiar problem here-in
both tax collection and charitable fundraising-is that potential
funders sometimes free ride, withholding support even from programs
they favor, hoping others will pick up the slack. Free riders depend on
imperfect information, since their true ability to pay (in the case of
taxes) and their true level of generosity (in the case of charity) can be
concealed, at least in part. In response, a familiar rationale for subsi-
dizing charitable contributions is to persuade donors to be more
generous.
2. Reflecting Preferences
A second challenge that arises in pursuing public goals, whether
through subsidized charity or in other ways, is that there is imperfect
information about which causes should be supported.23 We do not
know enough about popular preferences or about which emerging ap-
proaches or technologies are the most promising means to fulfill these
preferences. Those who claim to have this information, moreover,
may be motivated to misstate the facts. Does someone who is touting
a new approach to educating teenagers really believe that she will suc-
ceed, or is she merely seeking a donor- or government-supported
sinecure?
An important institutional design goal, then, is to funnel the subsidy
toward high-value projects. In response, subsidized charity can serve
as a means for identifying and reflecting popular preferences, since
the government invests money only when individual donors do so as
well. In a sense, donors are voting with their dollars. Whether indi-
vidual donors are making this decision (as in subsidized charity) or
government processes are doing so (as is the case with most policy
alternatives), flaws in the process will lead to an overinvestment in
some public goals and an underinvestment in others (as measured
against the social welfare function that is the baseline). "Allocation
23 There is a familiar parallel problem with gifts among family and friends. Donees
sometimes value gifts at less than their cost. See Joel Waldfogel, The Deadweight Loss of
Christmas, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 1328, 1328 (1993).
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error" is used here to describe the welfare cost of these misallocations.
As an example, assume that an eccentric donor uses a nonprofit to
build a museum on the history of ketchup-or, for that matter, an
eccentric member of Congress secures an earmark to build one in his
district. Allocating public money to this low-priority project, instead
of a high priority such as feeding hungry children, creates a welfare
cost. Minimizing this sort of allocation error is an important goal in
designing a subsidy for charitable contributions.
3. Monitoring Quality
Third, imagine that a soup kitchen opens too late in the morning-
missing the opportunity to serve breakfast-because its manager likes
to sleep late. Unlike the ketchup museum, the problem here is not
with the goal, but with the way it is pursued. As in any other setting,
agents are tempted to shirk or to behave self-interestedly, and princi-
pals may not have enough information to know they are doing so.
"Implementation error" is used here to describe the welfare costs
from poor or costly administration. Minimizing this sort of error is a
third objective in designing a subsidy for charitable contributions.
To what extent can a subsidy for charitable contributions deliver on
these goals, and at what cost? I turn now to a discussion of each of
these goals, the tradeoffs they present, and institutional design options
for mitigating these tradeoffs.
III. ENCOURAGING GENEROSITY
The fact that charity is voluntary gives rise to a tradeoff: Donors
enjoy giving to charity more than they enjoy paying taxes (because
charity is not compulsory) but, unfortunately, they do not give enough
(again, because charity not compulsory). A familiar reason to subsi-
dize charitable contributions is to address this incentive problem by
encouraging donors to be more generous.
A. The Tradeoff in Relying on Volunteers for Funding
1. Donor Satisfaction from Giving
A great advantage of relying on charitable contributions is that they
are given voluntarily, and thus avoid some of the welfare costs of
(compulsory) taxation. In generating utility for both the donor and
the donee-so-called "double" utility-charitable contributions avoid
the familiar problem of excess burden from taxation, which arises
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
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when taxpayers make wasteful changes in their behavior to avoid pay-
ing taxes. Indeed, the ability to deduct charitable deductions actually
may reduce the excess burden from taxation, as Peter Diamond has
claimed, by inducing taxpayers to work harder without having to pay
taxes on the extra income they earn (that is, as long as they give it to
charity) .24
Creating this double utility is not a frictionless process, as donors
must find charities that they enjoy supporting. Solving this informa-
tion problem is the role of professional fundraisers, who help pair do-
nors with programs they would enjoy funding that are also high
priorities for nonprofits. In effect, fundraisers are "double utility en-
gineers. ' '25 Obviously, there are administrative costs associated with
this effort, both for nonprofits (for example, the time of managers and
fundraisers as well as the cost of events, mailings, and the like) and for
potential donors (for example, time and effort reviewing solicitations).
Containing these costs is desirable, and it is worth knowing how they
compare with the administrative costs of a tax increase.
There also may be a qualitative difference, beyond any quantitative
one, between tax collection and charitable fundraising. The latter can
have collateral educational and community building benefits. For ex-
ample, when a zoo or museum hosts a benefit or sends a brochure
informing the public about its activities, it is providing entertainment
and information that is likely to be appealing to many people. Would
anyone say the same of Form 1040 or a tax audit?26
2. Free Riding and the Need for a Subsidy
Nevertheless, charity has the disadvantage of raising only a limited
amount. As noted above, even those who value a public goal may
look to others to pay for it when the benefits of a goal are widely
shared.27 A familiar response to free riding is a government subsidy,
which forces nondonors to give their support through taxes they pay.
24 Diamond, note 2, at 901.
25 Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 239, 253-56 (1984) (lawyers as "transaction cost engineers").
26 Perhaps the best analogy to a nonprofit's fundraising costs are the advertising ex-
penses incurred in the for-profit sector, which might be either informative or wasteful de-
pending upon the context. See William S. Vickrey, One Economist's View of Philanthropy,
in Philanthropy and Public Policy 31, 55 (Frank G. Dickinson ed., 1962) ("The pursuit of
the contributor's dollar has obvious external economies and diseconomies not greatly dis-
similar to those encountered in any kind of selling activity."). Meanwhile, even a Form
1040 can have some value aside from its role in tax collection, for example, as financial
disclosure to a taxpayer's creditor. I am indebted to Brian Galle for this point.
27 The charitable sector cannot command enough resources to fund all of society's pub-
lic goals; it represents only 6% of our economy compared with over 30% for the govern-
ment. See Auten, Clotfelter & Schmalbeck, note 7, at 392.
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If some would-be donors are discouraged from giving because they do
not want others to free ride on their generosity, then a subsidy reas-
sures these donors about giving. This is especially true if the subsidy is
structured as a match so that, in giving their own money, donors can
direct tax revenue to their preferred cause as well. 28
Of course, it would be counterproductive if donors have the oppo-
site reaction, responding to a subsidy by reducing their giving. Since
others are giving, they may feel that they are off the hook.2 9 This
reaction is likely for donations motivated by altruism (such that the
donor wants the cause to be supported, but does not care if she is the
one supporting it), but not for donations motivated by warm glow
(such that the donor cares that she herself is the source). The precise
effect obviously is an empirical question, and the vast literature on the
subject shows that tax subsidies do increase the level of contributions,
but by less than once was thought.30 There is clearly room for im-
provement on this dimension.
While we want to increase the volume of charitable contributions-
something a properly structured subsidy can do-we obviously also
want to preserve the double utility benefit too. When contributions
are subsidized, do donors still feel enthusiasm for contributing? The
double utility benefit is not as robust for marginal contributions, since
these are gifts that donors otherwise would not have made. Yet do-
nors still derive some utility from these gifts or they would not make
them (that is, as long as the subsidy is less than 100%). The donor
28 In the public finance literature, solutions to free-riding problems tend to link the giv-
ing of each donor to the giving of the others. For example, Mark Bagnoli and Barton
Lipman posit that the free-riding problem is solved if everyone's gift is conditioned on the
fact that everyone else must give; if even one person does not give, then everyone else
receives a refund. Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, Provision of Public Goods: Fully
Implementing the Core through Private Contributions, 56 Rev. Econ. Stud. 583, 584
(1989). In the same spirit, Todd Sandler and John Posnett theorize that donors are more
likely to give if they believe that, in giving, they are likely to prompt others to give. Todd
Sandler & John Posnett, The Private Provision of Public Goods: A Perspective on Neutral-
ity, 19 Pub. Fin. Q. 22, 24 (1991).
29 Using this logic, Peter Warr has proposed a "neutrality theorem," positing that subsi-
dies to charity will not affect the level of giving since government support will perfectly
crowd out private donations. Peter G. Warr, The Private Provision of a Public Good Is
Independent of the Distribution of Income, 13 Econ. Letters 207, 208 (1983). This influen-
tial article spawned a host of theoretical papers developing and critiquing this result. For
example, one problem with Warr's theory, pointed out in a widely cited piece by Berg-
strom, Blume and Varian, is that a subsidy can still increase giving on a net basis by tapping
nondonors. See Theodore Bergstrom, Lawrence Blume & Hal Varian, On the Private Pro-
vision of Public Goods, 29 J. Pub. Econ. 25, 27 (1986).
30 Early studies showing a larger effect failed to filter out effects on timing and thus
tended to overstate the impact on overall giving. Auten, Clotfelter & Schmalbeck, note 7,
at 417 (reporting new study with implied income elasticities of 0.41 and 0.43).
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also may derive utility from being able to direct government money to
her preferred cause as well.31
B. Institutional Design: Constraints on Donor Choice
How should the subsidy be structured if the goal is to encourage
generosity? Three issues are considered in this Section and the next
two: First, how free should donors be to choose the cause they want
to support? What constraints, if any, should there be on this choice?
Second, how should the subsidy be distributed among donors with dif-
ferent incomes? Should it focus especially on wealthy donors? Third,
how should the subsidy be structured? How much should be given
per dollar of charitable contribution? Should this level be constant
across all contributions, or should it change as giving increases?
The best way to encourage generosity is to give donors the broadest
possible latitude about which causes to support. People are more
likely to support causes that move them, so if the goal is to increase
the overall level of support (without regard to what is being sup-
ported), we ought to let donors choose.
There is, however, one important constraint: We need to be sure
the contribution is genuinely charitable, and is not a disguised
purchase of goods or services (which obviously would not generate
the same positive externalities). This is not a new insight, and current
law already polices this line through the private benefit doctrine, as
well as the requirement that charities disclose the value of goods or
services provided to donors, and the like.32 This concern also helps
explain why gifts to private individuals are not subsidized, even
though they can also generate positive externalities, as noted above.
It probably is too difficult to police whether a payment to a private
individual is a gift or part of an exchange.
31 The extent to which this is the case, if at all, obviously depends on the donor's utility
function. Louis Kaplow suggests that warm glow donors would not derive any utility from
the government's share of their contribution, since the whole idea of warm glow is that the
donor values the fact that the contribution comes from her. Kaplow, note 11, at 261-63.
Yet one can imagine donors who are happy to be "the source" of the contribution in the
sense that it happened because of their choice, even though it did not come from their
pocket. An analogy here is the pleasure that a trustee of a foundation takes in allocating
funds to a cause, even if the trustee is not the donor of the foundation's assets. To my
mind, this feeling of agency also should be considered warm glow.
32 See IRC § 501(c)(3) (containing private inurement prohibition) and § 170(f)(8)(B)
(requiring disclosure of any goods or services provided for contributions and a good faith
estimate of the value of such goods or services).
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C. Institutional Design: Distribution
A further institutional design choice is whether to focus subsidy dol-
lars on a particular subset of the population, or to spread them evenly.
If the goal is to encourage generosity most effectively-or, to be more
precise, to maximize the overall level of contributions induced by a
given subsidy expenditure-then the focus should be on high-income
donors.33 Empirically, their charitable giving is the most tax-sensitive,
and this is not surprising. It should cost less to induce a high-income
donor to give a dollar in charity than a low-income donor, since the
opportunity cost in welfare terms is higher for a low-income donor,
given the diminishing marginal utility of consumption. For instance, it
might require a subsidy of fifty cents to persuade the high-income do-
nor to donate a dollar, compared with a subsidy of a full dollar for the
low-income donor.34 Subsidy dollars concentrated at the upper end,
then, will induce more contributions.35
As a matter of distributional justice, an appealing aspect of encour-
aging charity from the wealthy is that it induces them to increase their
support of public goals. Since charity tends to be redistributive, we
are promoting voluntary redistribution, while also placing public bur-
dens on those best able to bear them. Even so, it is difficult to analyze
the distributional impact of the charitable subsidy in isolation. Obvi-
ously, the rate schedule has a pronounced distributional effect, and it
can be set in combination with the charitable subsidy, however struc-
tured, to achieve the overall objective we seek. For instance, one pos-
sible critique of focusing the charitable subsidy on the wealthy is that
they will disproportionately enjoy the consumption component of sub-
sidized charity-that is, the pleasure of making subsidized gifts. But
33 In this spirit, the charitable deductions in the estate and gift taxes are relevant only to
very wealthy people-since only they are subject to these taxes (assuming the incidence of
the tax is on decedents as opposed to heirs). While a discussion of whether these taxes are
justified is beyond this Article's scope, it is worth noting that an advantage of current law is
that the focus of the deduction in the estate and gift taxes is on very wealthy people, and
that this may be a relatively effective way to encourage generosity. It is worth noting,
moreover, that donor utility from making bequests may vary with the reason for the be-
quest. So-called "precautionary savers" who saved more than they needed and leave these
assets to a charity may derive relatively little utility from these inadvertent bequests.
34 Jeff Strnad, The Charitable Deduction: A Politico-Economic Analysis, in The Eco-
nomics of Nonprofit Institutions, note 8, at 265, 265 (noting that absolute value of price
elasticity increases with income).
35 There is an irony, then, in the fact that a deduction is currently used in our income
tax, instead of a credit. With a deduction, the subsidy per dollar obviously increases with
income (in allowing the taxpayer to avoid a higher marginal tax). It does not make sense
to offer a more generous subsidy per dollar to wealthy people, since they probably could
be persuaded to give with a lower subsidy per dollar, on average. Even so, the subsidy can
still be structured as a deduction if the amount per dollar is appropriate for high-income
taxpayers. If that is the case, then chances are it is too low for low-income taxpayers, such
that the subsidy focuses on the wealthy, for the reasons noted above.
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this does not raise any distributional issue if they "pay for" this con-
sumption benefit through the rate structure. Toward this end, the
charitable subsidy can be financed through an increase in the top
bracket, as Jeff Strnad has shown.36
A different distributional concern, though, is that subsidized charity
can give wealthy donors disproportionate influence in deciding which
public goals are pursued with tax dollars. As shown in Part IV, there
are ways to diminish this influence, but at the cost of encouraging gen-
erosity less effectively.
D. Institutional Design: Structure
I turn now to the "structure" of the subsidy, a term used here to
refer to the trigger for the government contribution, and how this trig-
ger changes in different circumstances.
1. Matching
If the goal is to encourage generosity, the subsidy should be struc-
tured as a match, so that it is triggered by private contributions. In
other words, the government should invest in a nonprofit only if pri-
vate donors also are doing so. This is an obvious virtue of the charita-
ble deduction under current law.
Yet there is a significant tax benefit for charity, wholly separate
from the tax deduction, that does not have a matching component:
the exemption of nonprofits from federal and state income tax. A
nonprofit can enjoy these benefits without collecting a single dollar
from a donor. These benefits do not reward charities for fundraising,
but for running a surplus. To see the point, consider two charities, A
and B. A has a $10 million budget, which comes entirely from private
donations, and A spends every dollar it raises on its programs. Since
A has no profit, it does not benefit from being tax exempt, even
though it is heavily engaged in fundraising. In contrast, B does no
fundraising at all. It raises $10 million per year from the fees it
charges customers, but it does not spend this entire amount on its pro-
grams. Since B runs at a profit, it benefits from being tax exempt; yet
this government support obviously is not targeted toward bringing in
more donations since, in this extreme example, there are no private
donations. Unlike the deduction for charitable contributions, then,
the tax exemption for nonprofits is not tailored to encourage addi-
tional private contributions. 37 If our goal is to encourage generosity,
36 Strnad, note 34, at 275-76.
37 Exemption from property taxes is not, strictly speaking, a matching program, but it is
close since someone must put up the money to buy the property. Yet if the charity finances
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we would be better off scaling back the tax exemption and redirecting
these resources to increase the generosity of the tax deduction. 38
2. Marginal Contributions
In designing the subsidy, we are more likely to maximize contribu-
tions by concentrating our resources on "near misses"-that is, on
marginal contributions the donor is tempted to make, but will not
make without a subsidy. To see the point, consider a donor who is
deciding whether to make gifts of $100,000 to any of four different
charities-A, B, C, and D. Let's say the donor derives $120,000 worth
of satisfaction from a $100,000 gift to A; $90,001 of satisfaction from a
$100,000 gift to B; $80,001 from such a gift to C; and $70,001 from
such a gift to D. Without a subsidy, the donor will make a gift only to
A, so that total private contributions are $100,000. Assume, then, that
the government introduces a $30,000 subsidy. To maximize contribu-
tions, the subsidy should go to the near misses, B and C: $10,000 for B
(so the donor has to give only $90,000) and $20,000 for C (so the do-
nor has to give only $80,000). This way, total private contributions
rise to $270,000. In contrast, dedicating $30,000 to D leads to a
smaller increase in private giving-to only $170,000-since A and D
are supported, but B and C are not. Finally, using the $30,000 subsidy
on A is counterproductive-since the donor will make this contribu-
tion anyway-and causes private contributions to decline to $70,000.3 9
the property by running an operating surplus, there is no matching element, and a property
tax exemption becomes no different from an income tax exemption.
38 Of course, there may be other justifications for a tax exemption-for example, as a
way to channel resources to nonprofits so they can reduce their prices, or as a way to
subsidize endowments, so they can substitute for the equity capital that a nonprofit cannot
attract. Yet there obviously are alternative means of pursuing these goals, such as tax-
exempt borrowing by nonprofits. In any event, a comprehensive evaluation of the tax
exemption is beyond this Article's scope.
39 The analysis above focuses on maximizing contributions and not on maximizing donor
utility, which is more complicated and, in any event, is only part of the picture (since we
also care about the utility of beneficiaries, and thus about the level of giving, allocation and
implementation error, and the like). To an extent, donor utility is also enhanced by focus-
ing on near misses, since donors would rather have these funded than their lower philan-
thropic priorities. Thus, donor utility is enhanced more by a subsidy for B and C-the near
misses-than by a subsidy for D. To see the point, use the example above and assume that
the donor has $400,000 that she can either give to charity or keep for personal consump-
tion. If B and C are subsidized, the donor's utility is $420,002 ($120,000 from the gift to A,
$90,001 from the gift to B, $80,001 from C, and $130,000 of utility from the money she
keeps). In contrast, if the subsidy is devoted to D, then her utility is only $420,001
($120,000 from A, $70,001 from D, and $230,000 from the money she keeps). In each case,
this is better than the donor's utility without a subsidy, which is only $420,000 ($120,000
from giving to A, and another $300,000 from the money she keeps). Yet donor utility
would increase even more with a subsidy that replaces gifts she would make anyway-such
as the gift to A-so she can keep (and consume) more money for herself. Thus, if the gift
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The problem, though, is unobservable heterogeneity. Some people
are more generous than others, so the level of contributions that is
marginal is hardly uniform. If we had perfect information, we would
know what each individual would do without a subsidy, and we would
customize the subsidy for each individual so that it focuses on margi-
nal contributions. But we do not know how generous people really
are and if we start the subsidy at a lower contribution level for less
generous taxpayers, then everyone has an incentive to understate
their generosity so they can collect a larger subsidy. Obviously, the
information costs here are quite substantial, raising the question
whether we should even try to account for heterogeneity in institu-
tional design. Do we want a standardized schedule that applies to
everyone, or one that is tailored to individuals? Options for a stan-
dardized schedule are considered first, since they are easier to admin-
ister, and then a tailored approach is discussed as well.
3. Slope of Subsidy: Declining, Constant, or Increasing?
Whatever we do, an important guideline is that any individual do-
nor is likely to find the first dollar she contributes to charity to be
easier than the last, since there is diminishing marginal utility in her
own consumption. To choose an extreme case, it obviously is easier
for someone who earns $100,000 to increase charitable giving from
zero to one dollar (and thus to forgo the last dollar of consumption)
than to increase her giving from $99,999 to $100,000 (and thus to forgo
the first dollar of her own consumption). 40
If we want a standard schedule for everyone, it seems a reasonably
safe bet that, for most donors, it is probably unnecessary to subsidize
the first dollar of charity, and the system would induce more contribu-
tions by redirecting these resources to offer more generous matches of
larger gifts, which are more likely to be at the margin. In this spirit, it
to A is subsidized, so that she contributes only $70,000, then her utility is $450,000
($120,000 from the gift to A, and $330,000 from the money she keeps). Although this
scenario offers higher utility to the donor, it obviously offers lower utility to potential
beneficiaries.
40 Although the analysis in the text does not consider charity to be part of a donor's
consumption, there obviously is a consumption element to charity, which is inherent in the
double utility concept. If we think donors have diminishing marginal utility in giving to
charity, as is typically the case with any consumption item, then the argument in the text
holds: Giving the first dollar generally is more appealing (and less in need of a subsidy)
than giving the last. Of course, one complication here is that there may be added con-
sumption value to giving a very large gift-including naming opportunities, being honored
at charitable dinners, and the like-which are not available through smaller gifts. Yet
these nontax inducements to make larger gifts are consistent with the idea of diminishing
marginal utility in giving; they are thought to be necessary because otherwise donors would
give less.
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is probably better for the government's match to increase as the donor
contributes a larger percentage of income to charity-instead of hav-
ing the match remain constant, or even decrease. 41
Current law does this, to a rough extent, by requiring taxpayers to
itemize in order to claim a charitable deduction; the first few dollars of
itemized deduction offer no tax benefit, since taxpayers could have
gotten the same result by claiming the standard deduction. But this is
quite an imperfect way of pursuing this goal, if only because taxpayers
who have enough mortgage interest or state and local income taxes to
justify itemizing can deduct the first dollar contributed to charity.
In any event, an important feature of our system is thoroughly in-
consistent with this principle: Taxpayers who contribute too high a
percentage of their income cannot deduct these excess contributions
(generally, contributions exceeding either 30% or 50% of their ad-
justed gross income, depending on the context).42 If we want the tax
system to induce more contributions, it is counterproductive to revoke
the government match from taxpayers as their giving rises above this
level. Since it is more daunting to give away 60% of your income than
10%, it is perverse to have a less generous match for the former.
Yet in contemplating a revision of this rule, we run up against a
competing value-ensuring that each taxpayer is involved, at least to
an extent, in funding public goals that are collectively determined. To
be clear, the rule is not necessary to ensure that they are supporting
public goals, since nonprofits also pursue public goals. Although I am
inclined to give priority to incentivizing contributions, reasonable
minds can disagree here, and the fault line likely will be whether we
trust wealthy individuals (the only people who can realistically give
away all their income) to support the right causes, a point that is dis-
cussed in detail in Part IV.
There is another way in which current law has it backwards: Instead
of offering a more generous match as the level of contributions rise, a
deduction (as opposed to a credit) becomes less valuable as giving
increases, as long as the rate structure is progressive. The reason is
that, if the taxpayer gives away enough of her income, she shifts to a
lower tax bracket, reducing the value of additional contributions be-
41 Saul Levmore also suggests a subsidy that increases as taxpayers give more than a
minimum percentage of their income. But his rationale is different. Levmore's goal is not
to increase the volume of contributions, but to be more equitable. People who give a
larger percentage of their income, he argues, are doing more than their share-they are
giving more than they would have had to give if the funds were raised through taxes, in-
stead of through charity-so they should be rewarded for doing so. Levmore, note 8, at
416 ("If ... any earner contributes more than his progressively required share, then it
might be fair to give a greater reward.").
42 See IRC § 170(b)(1).
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yond that point (since the tax that the deduction helps her avoid is
lower).43 The practical impact of this point should not be overstated,
though, since the donors who give very large gifts tend to have in-
comes so deep in the top bracket that, to them, the rate structure feels
flat. 4
4
A further problem with using a deduction (as opposed to a credit) is
that the government's match is tied inextricably to the tax rate. The
connection is that the government's matching contribution (in the
form of tax forgiven) depends on the tax rate. This obviously means
the charitable deduction is more valuable to high-income taxpayers
than to low-income taxpayers (who are subject to a lower tax rate),
which reinforces the concern that the deduction disproportionately
benefits wealthy taxpayers.45 A further problem is that the tax rate is
not, and cannot be, set to induce the maximum level of contributions.
Rather, in setting tax rates, policymakers are focused on different
elasticities: the willingness of taxpayers to work and save, not their
willingness to give to charity. It seems unlikely that these various elas-
ticities are so closely related that a tax rate tailored for work and sav-
ings will also yield an optimal result for charitable giving. Our system
would be more effective at encouraging generosity, then, if we stop
using a deduction, and instead use a tax credit calibrated to giving
elasticity, so that the credit's value generally increases with the per-
centage of income that the taxpayer is contributing.
Yet although it makes sense for the subsidy to increase in this way,
this general principle does not provide the answer to specific ques-
tions. Where exactly should the subsidy begin? At what point should
it increase? By how much? The problem with a uniform schedule,
obviously, is that a point that is marginal for some will be too low for
some and too high for others. As a result, a uniform schedule inevita-
bly will commit some of the subsidy to inframarginal contributions of
43 For example, assume that there are four tax rates: 0% on income up to $50,000, 20%
on income from $50,000 to $200,000, 25% on income from $200,000 to $300,000, and 33%
on all income above $300,000. For a taxpayer earning $400,000, the government offers a
one-for-two match on the first $100,000 of contributions: The taxpayer avoids a 33% tax,
so $66,666 of the first $100,000 comes from the taxpayer, while $33,333 comes from the
government. But if the taxpayer gives away $200,000, then the government's match on the
second $100,000 gift is only one-for-three. Because the tax rate has declined to 25%,
$75,000 comes from the taxpayer, while $25,000 comes from the government. Since it is
more difficult for the taxpayer to give the larger gift, it is unhelpful for the government's
match to decline in this way.
44 Indeed, given the limit on deducting more than 30% or 50% of adjusted gross income.,
described above, they typically cannot give enough away to get their incomes into a lower
bracket.
45 See Subsection IV.B.3 for a discussion of this distributional concern.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
2009]
very generous donors, and also may be too high to induce marginal
contributions from less generous donors.46
Although a uniform schedule cannot create perfect incentives, it
still can be improved. The challenge is a bit like the one for setting tax
rates, which also must account for an unobservable characteristic,
earning ability, which, like generosity, varies among taxpayers and
which they have an incentive to conceal. We should prefer a subsidy
schedule that, all else being equal, creates the right incentives often
enough to induce the maximum additional contributions.
In that spirit, since the average U.S. household with an income
above $100,000 gives 3% of their income to charity, the government
may not need to match smaller gifts (for example, less than 1.5% of
household income). 47 Instead, the government could use the savings
from such a floor to sweeten the match for larger gifts (for example, in
excess of 1.5%) in a revenue neutral way.4 8 Or we could have a multi-
tiered scale, such as a four-tiered credit in which (1) gifts totaling 1%
or less of income receive no credit; (2) gifts totaling between 1% and
3% get a 10% credit; (3) gifts between 3% and 10% get a 30% credit;
and (4) gifts over 10% get a 40% credit. There is a tradeoff here, in
which more nuanced incentives can be created at the cost of more
complexity.
Such a system is complicated not only in requiring multiple tiers,
but also in requiring other refinements. For instance, a system with
tiers would encourage taxpayers to concentrate into a single year gifts
that they otherwise would have given over multiple years. If no credit
is given for gifts under 1.5% of adjusted gross income, then a donor
46 The literature generally assumes that it is unfortunate to subsidize inframarginal con-
tributions. Indeed, the theoretical literature on the neutrality theorem and the empirical
literature on whether a subsidy generates additional contributions have as their (at times
unstated) premise the idea that this outcome is to be avoided. See note 29 (discussing and
citing literature for neutrality theorem). Yet it is worth observing that, as long as the cause
is a socially useful one, such that positive externalities are generated, the money is not
wasted. The main reason not to crowd out private contributions, then, is if they are raised
at lower social cost than taxes. I tend to think they are, but the answer to this empirical
question obviously depends on the context. I am grateful to Louis Kaplow for this
observation.
47 See President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform 75-76 (Nov. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report/ (proposing 1% floor).
48 For example, if a taxpayer has income of $1 million, every dollar of contribution in
excess of 1.5% of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income ($15,000 for this taxpayer) could
generate a credit of, say, 40 cents on her tax. If this taxpayer gave $15,000, then, she would
not receive any tax credit. But if she gave $100,000, she would receive a $34,000 credit
(that is, 40% of $85,000, which is the excess of $100,000 over the noncreditable $15,000).
This should create a stronger incentive to give than, say, a 34 cent credit for every dollar
given to charity (including the first dollar). The same analysis applies to taxpayers who
earn $50,000, such that we want to encourage them to give more than $750 (which is 1.5%
of their income).
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who otherwise gives 1.5% per year would likely give 4.5% in one year,
and then nothing in the next two. To avoid creating this sort of per-
verse incentive, this regime would require a mechanism for averaging
contributions and income across years (for example, a trailing three-
year average).
4. Individually Customized Schedule
Even with these necessary refinements, a uniform schedule is still
easier to administer than one that is individually tailored. But would a
customized schedule be more effective at inducing marginal contribu-
tions? To tailor the structure to an individual, we need information
about her generosity. The best information we have is what she has
given in the past. For instance, the system can look to a donor's aver-
age giving over the past five years, setting a floor so that no subsidy is
awarded for any giving below some fraction of this average giving (for
example, one-third). Likewise, an extra benefit can be offered for
contributions above this prior giving level.
For example, assume that Donor A and Donor B have the same
earnings-$-100,000 per year-but A is more generous than B. A has
given an average of 6% of income per year over the past five years,
while B has given 3%. Under this approach, then, A would receive no
subsidy for contributions below 2%, whereas the floor for less-gener-
ous B would be only 1%. Likewise, the extra generous subsidy for A
would apply to giving above 6%, and for B it would apply for giving
above 3%. The incentives here may be better than a one-size-fits-all
subsidy with a floor of, say, 4%, which would subsidize inframarginal
contributions from A, and at the same time would be out of range for
B.
Yet this individualized approach is more complicated, and it also
may induce donors to backload their giving. For example, instead of
giving 3% per year for six years, B could give nothing for five years,
and then could make a gift of the same present value in the sixth year.
In this way, B would deduct the entire amount, since her average giv-
ing over the preceding five years (and thus her threshold) would be
zero. Put another way, every dollar the donor gives in the current
year would have two effects: It would attract a subsidy in the current
year, but reduce the amount of the subsidy in future years. This struc-
ture also may yield perverse effects during times of inflation, since
increased nominal giving would not necessarily represent increased
actual giving. Likewise, in a cyclical economy, donors who have given
generously during a boom, unfortunately, would have less incentive to
maintain their giving during a subsequent downturn, since their prior
generosity would serve to reduce their current subsidy. More nuanced
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rules may temper these problems but probably would not eliminate
them, and this reality undercuts the benefit of an individualized sched-
ule. Indeed, a similar approach is used with the research and develop-
ment credit, and has prompted similar concerns. 49
5. Elasticity versus Externalities
Finally, it is worth emphasizing a potential tension between encour-
aging generosity, on one hand, and focusing on projects that generate
the most positive externalities, on the other. For instance, assume that
Donor A has an inelastic preference to support a project that gener-
ates a high level of positive externalities, and Donor B has an elastic
commitment to support a lower-value project. Should the subsidy fo-
cus on A's project (because of its higher value) or on B's (because of
B's more elastic giving)? Of course, if we had perfect information, we
could address both goals at the same time-for instance, by beginning
the subsidy of B at a lower contribution level (to address B's elastic
giving) while capping the subsidy dedicated to B's project (to account
for its lower social value). Yet in a world of imperfect information,
this subtle solution is difficult to pursue. Even so, in designing a sub-
sidy for charitable contributions, we need to consider not only the
need to encourage generosity, but also the need to allocate funds to
high-value projects. I turn now to a discussion of the latter goal.
IV. REFLECTING PREFERENCES
Another information problem in the pursuit of public goals is the
difficulty of knowing which programs would do the most good if sup-
ported. How should scarce public resources be divided among com-
peting priorities? Do the parties making these choices have the right
incentives? In subsidizing charitable contributions, we delegate signif-
icant influence over this decision to individual donors, who allocate
not just their own contribution but the matching government subsidy
as well.
This is a significant delegation of authority-not at all typical in
other government programs-and it presents two tradeoffs, one relat-
ing to the quality of decisionmaking and the other to its legitimacy.
First, decentralized decisionmaking can prompt experimentation and
competition, but suffers from a lack of coordination and scale (the
"coordination tradeoff"). Second, subsidized charity allows some
public money to be allocated outside the political process, thereby em-
49 See Robert Eisner, Steven H. Albert & Martin A. Sullivan, The New Incremental Tax
Credit for R&D: Incentive or Disincentive?, 37 Nat'l Tax J. 171 (1984).
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powering minorities to pursue their preferences but, at the same time,
concentrating disproportionate influence among wealthy donors (the
"representation tradeoff").
Institutional design can temper these tradeoffs, and various options
are highlighted here. To a degree, though, policy judgments also will
turn on instincts about whether government or nonprofits are more
deserving of our trust (or, perhaps, less deserving of our distrust).
A. The Coordination Tradeoff
Through charitable contributions, individual donors make indepen-
dent decisions about which public goals to support. In this decentral-
ized process, the information and incentive advantages of flexibility
and competition come hand in hand with the disadvantages of insuffi-
cient coordination. In a sense, the tradeoffs here resemble those of
relying on state or local government instead of the federal govern-
ment-except that here, of course, no government is making any sub-
stantive decisions, so that charity is even more flexible and local than
state and local governments.
1. Flexibility
The decentralized charitable process offers familiar advantages of
competition, flexibility, and experimentation. 50 Let's say, for exam-
ple, that we are committed to providing food to the homeless. To se-
cure government assistance for this objective-even at the more
flexible state or local level-we need to persuade a potentially large
set of key government decisionmakers. We might need to approach
key legislators, who could then help persuade a majority of their col-
leagues, either through the force of argument, vote trading, party loy-
alty, or other institutional mechanisms. We also need support in the
executive branch. In any political process, the preferences of the me-
dian voter loom large, as Burton Weisbrod has emphasized. 51 Bu-
reaucratic constraints are also significant, since any program will have
to comply with a host of civil service rules, standard procedures, and
the like. Sometimes bureaucratic incentives are complicated, focusing
as much on turf protection or work minimization as on the public
interest.
In contrast, pursuing this goal through a nonprofit can be very dif-
ferent. If we have resources and time of our own to contribute, we
can simply buy food and hand it out. We do not need anyone's ap-
50 See, e.g., Vickrey, note 26, at 36 (noting that charities enjoy "greater freedom of ac-
tion" than government).
51 Weisbrod, note 8, at 23.
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proval. Of course, we have to comply with all applicable laws Our
effort will be more substantial if we can recruit others to our cause
and, in doing so, we encounter some administrative complexity. 52 But
we still need to persuade only the group of people who are helping us.
As this example suggests, the decentralization of this allocation pro-
cess can allow nonprofits to be more nimble than the government. In
response to a crisis, they can be formed quickly and then shut down
once the need passes-all without clearing bureaucratic hurdles that
are common in government.
Relatedly, nonprofits are freer to engage in experimentation, and to
compete with each other. Even if there is a conventional wisdom
about how to pursue a public goal, it is relatively straightforward for
dissenters to form a new organization with a novel approach. If they
can attract volunteers to provide time and resources, they are off and
running. In the government, the process obviously would be quite dif-
ferent, requiring the requisite approvals within a hierarchy. Not sur-
prisingly, then, a number of important social movements-from civil
rights and women's rights to environmentalism-were pursued first
through nonprofits (for example, the NAACP, the ACLU Women's
Rights Project, the NRDC) before they ultimately became the subject
of government action. 53
Like state and local governments (but more so), nonprofits can rely
heavily on local preferences and information. This point is really an-
other manifestation of the lack of hierarchy within the nonprofit
world. A new program does not have to be cleared in Washington,
the state capital, or city hall.5 4 If a community has a unique need,
members of the community can organize to address it, without having
to make a case to people above them in a hierarchy who may have less
intimate knowledge of facts on the ground.
2. Lack of Filters or Coordination
Yet although a decentralized process can unleash creativity, it can
unleash less desirable qualities as well. Without hierarchies, nonprof-
its do not necessarily have the same filters that governments have to
52 For example, we probably will want to form a nonprofit corporation and provide tax-
related documentation to donors who make contributions.
53 This is not to say that nonprofits are all flexible and free of hierarchy. To some ex-
tent, there is an inverse correlation between flexibility and size. For instance, a large non-
profit hospital is likely to have hierarchies, and its institutional structure probably bears
more resemblance to a public hospital (that is, an arm of the state) than to a small start-up
charity. I am grateful to Reynold Levy for this observation.
54 Of course, some government action may be needed to secure income or property tax
exemptions, but those processes typically are quite different than the process of authoriz-
ing and appropriating funds for a new government program.
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screen out bad ideas. For example, a government manager who wants
to build a "public" playground immediately opposite her home pre-
sumably needs to justify this decision to senior officials within the hi-
erarchy, whereas there may be fewer constraints on a nonprofit
manager or donor to behave self-interestedly. Likewise, in govern-
ment a foolish use of public resources-such as the ketchup museum
discussed above-would require the approval of various levels of bu-
reaucracy, who (hopefully) would reject the idea. In contrast, a
wealthy donor could simply create her own nonprofit and contribute
money, thereby directing tax money to the project (that is, through
the charitable deduction) without anyone else's approval.
Even when donors and managers behave generously and sensibly,
lack of coordination can undercut the quality of their allocation deci-
sions. As Saul Levmore has emphasized, many donors are forced to
make decisions about what to support without full knowledge of what
other donors are doing.55 After September 11, for example, donors
gave so generously to help victims and their families that these chari-
ties were overfunded. 56 If donors had known how much others were
giving, they probably would have directed some donations elsewhere.
Yet this problem should not be overstated. Whereas donors may not
know how much the charity will receive this year, they can easily find
out about last year. This provides the necessary guidance as long as
giving patterns are relatively stable and, except in extraordinary cases
like September 11, they tend to be.
Finally, a decentralized allocation process is also ill-suited to poli-
cymaking that requires coordination. Obviously, some public goals in-
volve network effects or economies of scale, so that the quality of the
program is enhanced by standardization and size. Regulating natural
monopolies has this quality, as does the military, in the sense that a
chain of command is necessary, and would be harder to attain if we
relied on a series of independent militia units that were nonprofits.
B. Representation Tradeoff
A charitable subsidy's reliance on individual instead of collective
decisionmaking has implications not only for the quality of decision-
making, but also for its legitimacy.
55 Levmore, note 8, at 411 n.71.
56 See, e.g., C. Eugene Steuerle, Preparing for the Next Emergency: Some Lessons for
Charities from September 11 2 (Urban Inst., 2003), available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/310852_preparing-for-next-emergency.pdf ("[M]any of the direct victims'
needs could be met with only a fraction of the [September 11th] funds.").
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1. Minority Preferences
In a society in which tastes in public goods are heterogeneous, mi-
nority preferences may be underrepresented in the political process.
As Weisbrod has emphasized, nonprofits allow these political outliers
to organize and pursue goals that the general political process may not
favor.57 Ensuring that the funding for public goals is not a "winner
take all" competition-such that minority preferences also are re-
flected-enhances the legitimacy of both the process for allocating
funding and the outcome.
Minority preferences are registered not by political compromise or
a mechanism that binds the decisions of elected officials, but by cir-
cumventing elected officials entirely. Donors vote directly with their
contributions, Saul Levmore has observed, using "taxes as ballots."58
Levmore argues that this mechanism is more likely to reflect popular
preferences than governments burdened by public choice problems. 59
Obviously, one's reaction to this idea is likely to depend, to a signif-
icant degree, on one's view of government. If we believe that elected
officials have unique legitimacy as decisionmakers and that public
goals need to be pursued communally, then we are likely to worry that
donors, in allocating public resources, are usurping an authority more
properly exercised by government. In contrast, if we are skeptical
about the government's inclination and ability to reflect popular will,
as opposed to the agendas of interest groups and professional politi-
cians, then we are more likely to favor a robust role for donors as a
useful and legitimate complement to the government's efforts. Like
Levmore, I am inclined to take the latter view, but reasonable minds
can disagree on this point.
2. Separation of Church and State
In any event, even those who believe that government decisions are
uniquely legitimate are likely to feel differently about funding relig-
ious organizations. If public money is to go to religious groups, there
are clear advantages in leaving the allocation of funds to individuals.
Obviously, it is unconstitutional in the United States for government
officials to make decisions about which religion to support, and it
makes good sense, for a range of reasons beyond the scope of this
Article, to reserve this sphere of life to organizations that are purely
voluntary, and that can compete freely with each other for members
without invoking the force of law.
57 Weisbrod, note 8, at 31.
58 Levmore, note 8, at 404-05.
59 Id. at 406.
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3. Disproportionate Representation of Wealthy Donors
Although letting donors allocate public money has process-related
advantages, as discussed above, there are two problems with doing so.
The first is that donors may not adequately represent the preferences
of society as a whole, so that there is allocation error when the wrong
projects are pursued. Yet this concern should not be overstated. Ob-
viously, there is no issue when donors pursue projects that nondonors
also support. There also is no problem when donors neglect projects
that nondonors would support, since the government is free to pick up
the slack. Allocation error arises, then, only if donors overinvest in
projects that do not command broad support. In some cases, this re-
sult is not at all problematic, for instance, if the lack of support in the
general population is due to imperfect information. This may be the
case, for example, with scientific research that has broad social value,
but is better understood in the nonprofit world than in the population
as a whole. But obviously in other cases, the lack of broad support
derives from differences in taste, such that the commitment of public
resources is harder to justify. This no doubt happens in the nonprofit
sector, but it is worth remembering that it also happens in government
(for example, through the influence of well-organized interest
groups), and it is an empirical question about where the problem is
more pervasive.
Even if the right projects are funded, there is a further problem that
wealthy people have a louder voice in the process. 60 Wealthy donors
have more money to give, and thus can disproportionately influence
the allocation of public money (that is, the tax subsidy). To my mind,
this is the most powerful critique of the charitable deduction.
To put it in context, though, it is worth remembering that wealthy
people already exercise disproportionate influence over the market
economy, as well as over other government decisions, given the im-
portance of campaign contributions to elected officials. 61 Whether
government funds are allocated actively by government officials or
passively by government matches, wealthy people are likely to exert
disproportionate influence either way. Indeed, if we are interested in
reducing the influence exerted by wealthy people, we should start with
their role in government decisionmaking, since that context does not
offer voluntary redistribution and other welfare benefits to low-in-
come people that are inherent in subsidized charity.
60 See Levmore, note 8, at 405-06 (noting concern that "charitable deduction institutes
something of a poll tax" and that "wealthier taxpayers can afford more votes").
61 See, e.g., Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Banking on Becoming President, http://www.
opensecrets.org/presO8/index.php (last visited Jan. 19, 2009) (noting that in the 2008 Presi-
dential election the two major candidates raised $1.11 billion and spent $1.04 billion).
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In any event, although it is reasonable to have reservations about
allowing wealthy people to allocate public funds in this way, this is a
price we must pay in order to secure the advantages of subsidized
charity, which are substantial. Giving donors control over what they
support is a necessary precondition for securing voluntary redistribu-
tion and a socially cheap source of funding for other public goals, and
also for creating a set of flexible institutions that compete and experi-
ment. As with any tradeoff, though, the question is not a binary one.
Through nuances of institutional design, we can offer donors some
types of control, while withholding others.
C. Institutional Design: Constraints on Donor Choice
If the subsidy's goal is to reflect preferences, it should be designed
somewhat differently than if the objective is to encourage generosity
or to recruit private monitors. Once again, three issues are discussed:
the degree of control donors should have over the causes they sup-
port, the distribution of the subsidy across income classes, and the
structure of the subsidy.
Whereas current law leaves individual donors with substantial con-
trol over what causes they (and government matching funds) will sup-
port, this individual control has costs as well as benefits, as noted
above. This Section explores four different ways to constrain individ-
ual control. The first three do not involve any active decisionmaking
by government officials, but make the requirements for claiming the
subsidy more specific and rigorous: They relate to the characteristics
of charities that are supported ("structuring limits"), the subject mat-
ter ("substantive limits"), and the freedom of wealthy people to par-
ticipate ("eligibility limits"). The fourth involves the government in
reviewing specific proposals. After discussing this range of options,
this Section briefly considers two salient questions in the academic
literature: whether a system of matching grants should replace the
deduction, and whether a subsidy should be available to for-profit
charity.
1. Structuring Limits
Without limiting the types of causes that donors can support or the
freedom of wealthy people to make subsidized contributions, the gov-
ernment can specify criteria that individual organizations must meet
(having nothing to do with which cause they support). This sort of
structuring requirement already exists under current law: For exam-
ple, the organization must be organized as a nonprofit-an issue to
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which I return below62-and contributions must be for the public
good, not for the private benefit of donors, as noted above.
The virtue of structuring requirements is that, if they are crafted
wisely, they can enhance the quality of individual decisionmaking
without significantly limiting individual control over subject matter; as
a result, they should not diminish a donor's utility in giving (so that a
tradeoff with the goal of encouraging generosity is avoided) and these
structuring requirements also should not impede the process of exper-
imentation and competition. Yet for the same reason-because they
do not reclaim substantive decisonmaking from individual donors to
any significant degree-structuring requirements do not respond as
directly to legitimacy concerns about wealthy donors exerting dispro-
portionate control, although they can offer some help on that dimen-
sion as well.
In this spirit, current law could be changed to make greater use of
participation requirements, so that an individual donor could claim a
deduction only if a minimum number of other donors also contributed
to the cause (even in very small amounts). 63 Participation require-
ments mitigate the coordination tradeoff by introducing a useful filter,
making it more difficult for an idiosyncratic or self-interested donor to
pursue an unwise idea with public money. We could solve the ketchup
museum problem, for example, by requiring that a donor could claim
a tax deduction for a project only if a minimum number of other do-
nors were also willing to contribute. Thus, participation requirements
can also mitigate the representation tradeoff as well, ensuring that
wealthy donors are acting for others as well as for themselves.
At the same time, participation requirements do not limit in any
way the subject matter that the donor is pursuing, so that donors
should still derive full utility from giving. Indeed, they may feel all the
better knowing that others share their goal. Donors should remain
(largely) free to experiment, as long as they can attract the requisite
number of people to join in the effort. It is worth observing, though,
that poorly crafted participation requirements could be subject to
abuse, for instance, when small donors are in effect bribed to contrib-
ute to a cause that a large donor wishes to support.
A second structuring innovation involves information. In general,
public charities already fill out Form 990, and these are now available
62 See Subsection IV.C.6.
63 Current law already incorporates this distinction to a degree in distinguishing public
charities from foundations. Compare IRC § 170(b)(1)(A)(viii) (allowing a deduction up to
50% of an individual's adjusted gross income (AGI) for contributions to broadly supported
charities, as defined in § 509(a)(2)), with IRC § 170(b)(1)(B) (allowing a deduction of 30%
of AGI for contributions to most private foundations).
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tion, and could compile it in ways that enhance individual decision-
making. For example, Levmore worries that charitable donors do not
know enough about what other donors are doing when making their
own allocation decisions, as noted above. 65 In response, the govern-
ment could publish an annual "charity budget," cataloging how chari-
table funds are allocated among different causes. What percentage
has been devoted to education, the environment, poverty relief, and
religious organizations? The government could propose classifica-
tions and ask charities to code themselves on Form 990. As with par-
ticipation requirements, this structuring requirement does not seek to
favor one type of cause over another, but to help individuals make
better informed decisions.
In addition, this information would be valuable to the government,
since government budgets should adjust to offset under- and over-
funding within the charitable sector. For example, if the opera is al-
ready well taken care of, the National Endowment for the Arts should
reallocate funding elsewhere.
2. Substantive Limits
In a more assertive intervention, the government could express a
preference for some public goals over others. To a limited extent, sub-
stantive limits already exist under current law. First, the list of chari-
table purposes in § 501(c)(3) is broad, but not unlimited. Not
everything qualifies as, "religious, charitable, scientific .... literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition ... or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals. '66 For instance, enhancing national defense does not qualify,
and rightly so, since national defense is not an appropriate subject for
individual policymaking.67 Second, the government already can disal-
low the charitable deduction for reasons of public policy. Thus, the
deduction is not available for contributions to charities that finance
terrorism or to colleges that ban interracial dating.68 The government
64 See Guide Star, Nonprofit Reports and Forms 990 for Donors, Grantmakers and
Businesses, http://www.guidestar.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2009).
65 See text accompanying note 55.
66 IRC § 501(c)(3).
67 There are of course nonprofits, such as the National Defense University Foundation,
that support research about defense issues and the training of military leaders. In addition,
someone wishing to support national defense by making payments to the federal govern-
ment in addition to her tax payments can deduct these extra payments, but this is different
from forming a nonprofit that would supplement the nation's defense capabilities.
68 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (disallowing charitable
deduction to college that bans interracial dating); U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Anti-Terror-
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is free to make greater use of this power by offering a broader list of
disallowed causes.
As an even stricter substantive limit, the government could offer
extra-generous tax benefits to causes that it deems a particularly high
community priority. The government could offer different tiers of tax
benefits, and periodically could prioritize among different types of
causes. In one year, Congress could favor poverty relief and, in an-
other, environmental protection; thus, donations to any charities with
these missions could become eligible for especially generous tax bene-
fits, while other charities would remain in the standard program.
Since different charities generate different externalities, the subsidy
for different activities should vary, at least in principle.69 A systematic
effort in this regard could reduce the risk of allocation error and also
could enhance legitimacy by constraining the discretion of wealthy do-
nors. For example, we may think that private donors overspend on
opera, museums, and other cultural institutions, while underspending
on the homeless and the developing world; tax benefits could be
scaled back for the former and ramped up for the latter.70 Meanwhile,
individuals still would be allowed to exercise discretion within the
(narrowed) parameters, such that experimentation and competition
would still continue, albeit to a lesser degree.
Yet there are reasons not to increase government control in this
way. Obviously, there is a tension with the goal of maximizing gener-
osity. Some would-be donors to disfavored categories may give as
much overall as they otherwise would have, while simply redirecting
their giving to favored categories. But others may simply reduce their
overall level of giving.
A further cost of this approach is that the system becomes more
complicated. If different types of nonprofits are supported in differ-
ent degrees, charities would have to classify themselves. Assuming
poverty relief was favored, would a law school qualify by offering fi-
nancial aid for low-income students and clinical programs for indigent
clients? Could a portion of the law school's overhead be allocated to
these causes and, if so, what percentage? If not, would the result
change if the law school created a separate nonprofit to house these
programs, and charged it for the use of law school facilities? From the
ist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/0929%20finalrevised.pdf.
69 See Strnad, note 34, at 279 ("Generally, . . . different activities will have different
price elasticities and income elasticities for contributions, different nonsubsidy levels of
contributions and different optimal levels of contributions. This suggests that the optimal
subsidy-rate structure for contributions may vary substantially across activities.").
70 Cf. Gergen, note 7, at 1443-47, 1450 (arguing that charitable deduction should not
apply to public television and that scope of deduction is too broad).
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donor's perspective, the preparation of a return can be complex
enough, without cluttering it further with different tax benefits for dif-
ferent charities.
In addition, once the government declared itself in the business of
differentiating among charities, the incentive of nonprofit managers to
invest time and resources in lobbying the government would increase
substantially. 71 Nepotism and corruption would rear their ugly heads,
as the lobby for universities competed with the lobby for museums to
hire a key Senator's daughter. Nonprofit managers also would be fur-
ther detached from their primary mission of running nonprofits, as the
burdens of lobbying were added to the burdens of capital campaigns.
To my mind, the added government input is not worth these costs,
although reasonable minds can disagree on the point.
3. Eligibility Limits
Another response to the disproportionate influence of wealthy do-
nors is to limit what they can contribute. This approach, which con-
flicts with the goal of encouraging generosity, is discussed further
below under distribution. 72
4. Project-by-Project Review
In the three prior categories, the government ratchets up the rigor
and detail of the eligibility requirements for making subsidized contri-
butions, but does not pass on the wisdom of specific contributions. In
theory, though, the government could claim the right to sign off on
particular gifts. For example, Congress or a particular committee
could be required to approve tax benefits above a particular size. Af-
ter all, in deducting a billion dollar charitable contribution, a taxpayer
reroutes a very substantial amount of tax revenue, and a case can be
made for government input in this decision. More generally, the gov-
ernment could function like a private foundation, accepting applica-
tions in which donors ask the government to match their
contributions.
This step lends greater coordination to charitable giving and dimin-
ishes the influence of wealthy donors, but at significant (and to my
mind excessive) cost. To process the relevant information and make
particularized judgments, the government would need a sizable infra-
structure. Yet although the cost of government decisionmaking in-
71 See Brody, note 7, at 752 n.262 (noting that one benefit of the current tax deduction is
that "'the beneficiary organizations receive their governmental aid without having to peti-
tion for it"' (quoting Charles William Elliot)).
72 See Section IV.D.
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creases dramatically, quality and legitimacy would not necessarily
improve. In substituting their own judgments for those of private par-
ties, government decisionmakers would forgo some of the benefits of
experimentation and competition. This more active approach would
not represent minority perspectives as readily, and also would spawn
lobbying, and the nepotism and corruption that sometimes accompany
it. It also might reduce the overall level of private giving in curtailing
the choices open to private donors.
5. Tax System Versus Expenditure System
So far, this Section has considered various changes in the way the
charitable subsidy is allocated. Another alternative, which has re-
ceived attention in the literature, is to remove the function entirely
from the tax system. Since Stanley Surrey, many tax academics have
urged the tax system to focus only on raising tax revenue. In this
spirit, Paul McDaniel suggests replacing the charitable deduction with
a system of matching grants housed outside the tax system. 73
Although at first blush this seems like a radical change, there is less
at stake here than first meets the eye. Either alternative can be struc-
tured in a range of ways, and there is considerable overlap in what
they can achieve. For example, either a tax-based system or a direct
expenditure system can specify substantive priorities or limit the eligi-
bility of wealthy taxpayers.
There are two main differences. First, the tax system is less able to
conduct project-by-project review, since its employees lack expertise
to evaluate the substance of donor proposals. If the government
wants to pass on the merits of a proposal to support education, the
Department of Education is better positioned than the Service to do
so. Yet although the best reason to adopt McDaniel's proposal is for
project-by-project review, there are significant reasons to oppose ac-
tive government screening, as noted above.
Second, using an expenditure system might increase overall admin-
istrative costs. This is obviously the case if project-by-project review
was adopted. But even if the government's role was more modest-so
that current law is replicated, but moved out of the tax system-the
cost savings in the tax system might be more than offset by the cost of
creating a new bureaucracy.74 For instance, there are synergies in ad-
73 See McDaniel, note 1.
74 One advantage for the tax system is that more taxpayers could claim the standard
deduction instead of itemizing, such that their paperwork becomes much easier. I am in-
debted to George Yin for this point. But if the same taxpayers must file a separate applica-
tion for a charitable match, it is not obvious that the overall administrative burden would
decline, and it might well increase.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
2009]
TAX LAW REVIEW
ministering the subsidy through the tax system, since the information
it collects (for example, a donor's level of income) is likely to be
relevant.
6. For-Profit Charity
In discussing constraints on donor choice, it is worth considering
one more intriguing proposal in the academic literature. Anup Malani
and Eric Posner argue that the subsidy should not be limited to non-
profits, but should be available to for-profits as well.75 They argue
that for-profits offer better incentives for charitable managers to be
efficient, for instance, at minimizing costs. 76 This is probably true, al-
though a for-profit manager might not have the same incentive to en-
hance the quality of charitable endeavors, as Malani and Posner
acknowledge. 77
Yet the main problem with Malani and Posner's proposal is that it
puts pressure on the process for allocating the subsidy. Not-for-profit
form is a useful, if imperfect, proxy for charitable purpose. As Henry
Hansmann has argued, nonprofit managers signal their dedication to
the cause by forgoing the opportunity to claim profits-the so-called
"nondistribution constraint. '78 Malani and Posner are right that, in
principle, for-profit managers also can be committed to philanthropy,
but how can we tell? Under current law, the substantive scope of the
charitable subsidy is quite broad-too broad to distinguish for-profits
with genuinely charitable purposes from those who wish to pad their
profits: The subsidy supports any efforts that are "religious, charita-
ble, scientific .... literary, or educational purposes, or to foster na-
tional or international amateur sports competition . .. or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals. '79 Yet any research and
development efforts of for-profit firms might qualify as "scientific."
Perhaps advertising expenses are "educational." Maybe the work of
securities markets is also "educational," since prices have important
informational value. Newspapers surely would make a similar claim,
as would the publishing and maybe even the entertainment industry.
The answer here, obviously, is to tighten up the definition of which
activities are eligible. In other words, for-profits also should be subsi-
dized, as Malani and Posner suggest, but the subsidy cannot be an
open-ended one, like the charitable subsidy under current law. In-
75 Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 Va. L. Rev. 2017
(2007).
76 Id. at 2028-29.
77 Id. at 2033.
78 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
79 IRC § 501(c)(3).
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stead, if the government specifies a goal -like building a particular
fighter plane or developing alternative fuels-a for-profit can be
trusted to pursue this specified goal and, as Posner and Malani ob-
serve, they have incentives to contain costs. In this spirit, for-profit
firms commonly receive government resources in other contexts.
They are hired as government contractors and also enjoy targeted tax
benefits such as accelerated depreciation, 80 alternative energy tax
credits, 81 and the like.82
Yet making the regime for charitable subsidies comparably spe-
cific-a necessary step if for-profits are to be included-comes at a
significant cost. As noted above, the vague definition of current law
has value in taking the government out of the allocation process,83 and
in promoting experimentation and competition. 84 This way, causes
not yet imagined can find a start with a small group of donors. This is
a cost that Malani and Posner never discuss, but it strikes me as ex-
tremely important. As a result, it is better to subsidize for-profits in
other ways (as, obviously, is quite common), while limiting the chari-
table subsidy-with its usefully vague scope-to nonprofits.
Even so, Malani and Posner are right that nonprofits have their own
incentive problems, including the risk of inefficient implementation.
Part V considers a range of ways to address this issue.
D. Institutional Design: Distribution and Structure
If the goal is to reflect preferences, instead of to enhance generos-
ity, then directing the subsidy to wealthy donors becomes problematic,
for the reasons noted above.85 Their preferences may not be repre-
sentative and, even if they are, there is a process-related concern with
giving them a greater say in the allocation of public money.
One strategy for addressing this concern, as noted above,8 6 is to
limit the discretion of wealthy donors in a range of ways. The idea is
80 See IRC § 168.
81 See IRC §§ 45, 48.
82 Indeed, for-profits can even claim the charitable subsidy, for instance, by contributing
to a charitable foundation that then works with them to pursue a charitable goal. Malani
and Posner acknowledge this possibility, but suggest that the introduction of a charitable
affiliate is wasteful, and that for-profits should be allowed to pursue charitable goals di-
rectly. Malani & Posner, note 75, at 2056-57. Yet the introduction of a separate entity is
not as wasteful as they suggest, since it can help segregate the revenues and expenses of the
philanthropic endeavor from those of for-profit activities in a legally meaningful way. Put
another way, transfer pricing is already quite malleable, and without separate legal entities
it becomes even harder to monitor.
83 See text accompanying note 52.
84 See text accompanying note 50.
85 See Subsection IV.B.3.
86 See Subsections IV.C.1-IV.C.3.
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to keep subsidizing their charitable contributions-and thus to keep
encouraging their generosity-while at the same time using the politi-
cal process, and the rest of the population's ability to be represented
in it, to constrain what charitable donors can do with public money.
Instead of relying on wealthy donors for contributions but reducing
their discretion, another option is to seek more contributions from
low- and middle-income donors. In this spirit, these donors can re-
ceive a refundable credit or some other especially generous subsidy.
At the limit, we could even use a checkoff, in which taxpayers can
allocate money to a cause of their choice (by "checking off" a box on
their tax return) without contributing any money of their own.87 Yet
if individuals do not have to invest any of their own funds, they may
not give enough thought to the choice. Instead, they should be re-
quired to invest some amount of "earnest money," but less than what
wealthy people must put up.88
Correspondingly, the subsidy claimed by wealthy donors can be
capped. The limit could be either a dollar amount or, as under current
law, a percentage of income. By relying on caps or multiple subsidy
schedules in this way, we can reduce the percentage of the subsidy
dedicated to the wealthiest taxpayers. 89 Yet the tradeoff, obviously, is
that the subsidy will be less successful at encouraging generosity.
V. RECRUITING PRIVATE MONITORS
A further problem of information and incentives that arises in the
pursuit of public goals-whether through government or through pri-
vate actors-is the difficulty of monitoring quality. In response, an-
other purpose of subsidized charity is to recruit private donors as
monitors. Since they are contributing their own money, donors have
the incentive to assess whether their gifts are having a positive impact.
When the donor is capable of making a large contribution, moreover,
she is likely to have influence with the nonprofit manager. By pas-
sively subsidizing such gifts, the government piggybacks on the posi-
tive externalities associated with this monitoring-a point that, to my
knowledge, has not been made before in the academic literature on
charitable subsidies.
87 Levmore, note 8, at 389-404.
88 I am indebted to Dan Shaviro for the "earnest money" formulation.
89 Although transfer taxes generally are beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth
remembering that the charitable deduction in that regime is enjoyed exclusively by very
wealthy people, since only they are subject to the tax.
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A. Information and Incentive Problems in Governing Nonprofits
While the success of any enterprise needs to be monitored, nonprof-
its and government face special problems. They cannot use profitabil-
ity as a measure of success. In addition, there can be a separation
between those who benefit from nonprofit and government programs
and those who pay for them.
The classic academic response, first emphasized by Henry
Hansmann, is that nonprofit managers cannot receive a distribution of
profits, and thus are shielded from the temptation to cut corners on
quality. 90 Like nonprofits, the government also has a nondistribution
constraint. 91 In both settings, the constraint is helpful, to be sure, but
not wholly effective. For example, it is well understood that the
nondistribution constraint cannot keep nonprofit managers from pam-
pering themselves with inflated salaries, a short working day, and the
like. Nor does it ensure that managers display good judgment or run a
well-functioning organization.
To an extent, the beneficiaries of nonprofit and government pro-
grams monitor quality, but not always effectively. They need enough
information about quality to be able to make a judgment. Individual
beneficiaries may not have access to such information, or may not
have the sophistication to evaluate it; they may be helped, to an ex-
tent, by organizations that evaluate the performance of nonprofits, but
the quality of these efforts varies as well.92 In addition, if the evalua-
tion is negative, beneficiaries need an alternative so they can vote with
their feet. These conditions do not always hold. For instance, exit
may be difficult either because there are not any practically available
alternatives (for example, only one religious school in the neighbor-
hood) or because the nonprofit's endowment gives it an advantage
that is hard to replicate (for example, leaving the church means losing
the church building).
In addition to beneficiaries, senior managers in nonprofits and gov-
ernment can be of some help. They typically have a personal commit-
ment to the cause, as evidenced by their willingness to work for
below-market wages. 93 Although some may be looking for lighter
90 Hansmann, note 78, at 844.
91 This point is obvious but, as far as I know, is not salient in the academic literature.
The reason is that Hansmann's excellent work generally compares nonprofits with for-
profits, not with government.
92 Examples include Charity Navigator, http://www.charitynavigator.org/, and the Better
Business Bureau/Wise Giving, http://www.bbb.org/us/charity/.
93 Survey evidence shows that nonprofit and for-profit managers are comparable in their
talent and work ethic, but nonprofit managers tend to be more community-oriented and
collaborative. There is similar survey data about public interest lawyers who work for
nonprofits. See Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Economy 32 (1988).
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hours and better quality of life, the lean staffing at nonprofits and gov-
ernment tends to undercut this motivation, especially for senior peo-
ple. Yet even idealists need to be monitored, if only to ensure that
they are not making mistakes or unwise judgments. Also, idealists are
not immune from self-interested behavior, especially if no one is
watching.
The government also monitors nonprofits to a degree through the
state attorney general and a range of other context-specific regimes.
It is a familiar point that the state attorney general's oversight of the
nonprofit sector generally is quite limited.94 The extent of other regu-
lation varies, sometimes dramatically, so that hospitals are subject to
stringent regulation, while religious institutions are essentially
unregulated.
B. Tradeoffs in Donor Monitoring
To fill in the gaps, donors can play a significant role in advising non-
profit managers and monitoring performance. Since monitoring in a
governmental setting generally is quite different, donor monitoring is
a distinctive feature of subsidized charity that previously has not been
recognized in the academic literature. There are two tradeoffs associ-
ated with donor monitoring, one relating to the skill sets of donors
and the other to their incentives.
1. Skill-Set Tradeoff
An important advantage of donor monitoring is that donors can be
the source of rare expertise, helping to fill in gaps in the skill sets of
nonprofit managers. The typical nonprofit manager has deep knowl-
edge about the nonprofit's mission and an idealistic commitment to it.
But some nonprofit managers do not have equally deep experience in
crafting budgets, refining communications strategies, structuring de-
partments, engaging in strategic planning, handling complicated sub-
ordinates, conducting periodic reviews, implementing governance
systems, and the other nitty gritty that is second nature to successful
entrepreneurs and for-profit managers. Of course, some nonprofit
managers do have these skills, but for those who do not, there is an
obvious source of advice to be tapped: These skills are common
among significant donors.
This complementarity of skill sets creates the possibility for a highly
synergistic partnership between nonprofit managers and donors-one
94 See, e.g., George Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal
Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117
Harv. L. Rev. 1102, 1152-53 (2004).
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that can be replicated in every sector of the nonprofit world. To this
partnership, donors contribute business acumen, advising the non-
profit manager on strategic questions, crisis management, and the day-
to-day challenges of running an institution. Through these interac-
tions, donors have ample opportunity to evaluate the performance of
the nonprofit's programs and senior management.
Yet the tradeoff here is that donor expertise has limits, and it is
important for donors to respect these limits. A highly successful in-
vestment banker has much to add to the operation of a hospital, but
evaluating the quality of competing methods of treatment is probably
not her strong suit. Although an accomplished movie producer can
help a museum with branding and budgets, she may have less to say
about which works of art are worth acquiring. Donors need to recog-
nize that some issues are beyond their expertise and that some deci-
sions need to be the responsibility of the nonprofit's professional staff
(although the staff can be asked to explain their judgments). In my
experience, donors usually have a clear understanding of these bound-
aries, but it is too optimistic to assume that donors always do. When
donors seek to intervene beyond their expertise, nonprofit managers
are in the delicate position of having to establish boundaries but,
hopefully, without offending the donor and losing a potentially valua-
ble source of funding. 95
This is a long way of saying that wise and sophisticated donors can
add considerable value, but that not all donors are wise and sophisti-
cated. The challenge here is to empower donors whose input is con-
structive, while constraining the influence of those who are not.
2. Incentives Tradeoff
To monitor a nonprofit's success, a donor must have not only the
skills, but also the incentive, to do so. An important precondition of
the donor-manager partnership, described above, is the donor's will-
ingness to invest time. Admittedly, some prefer to write a check and
then have nothing else to do with a group (for instance, because they
95 This analysis focuses on individual donors, as opposed to foundations. Foundation
managers are sometimes professionals whose skill set overlaps significantly with the non-
profit manager's, such that they have more detailed knowledge than individual donors
about the cause. Given their connection to a range of nonprofits, they are likely to have
deep experience in advising and evaluating charitable programs. In some cases, though,
professional foundation managers have somewhat less business experience than individual
donors. Professional foundation managers also bring the potential for another incentive
problem-the possibility that the foundation manager is not pursuing the agenda set by the
donor who created the foundation. This agency cost problem obviously does not arise
when donors make their own philanthropic decisions. These important issues require more
extensive treatment than can be offered in this Article.
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are contributing as a favor to a friend). Yet especially among those
who make large contributions, there is a strong incentive to ensure
that money is well spent. After all, there are many potential outlets
for a substantial gift, and donors want to be sure they choose the right
one. They typically want access to the nonprofit's leaders before mak-
ing the decision to provide financial support, and they usually want
the relationship to continue after their initial contribution. This is all
the more true, of course, if a feature of the nonprofit bears their
name, such as a professorship or a concert hall. Then it becomes
"their" opera or school, in a very personal sense.
This interest of donors in giving time, as well as resources, is exem-
plified by a new trend known as "venture philanthropy." The quintes-
sential venture philanthropist is an investment manager whose "day
job" involves critiquing business plans, evaluating senior management
and, more generally, making judgments about where to commit capi-
tal in the for-profit sector. The idea behind "venture" philanthropy is
to bring the same approach to the nonprofit world. Venture philan-
thropists do not want to hear only about how important a cause is;
they want to hear what the nonprofit leader plans to do about it. They
want detailed plans, progress reports, documented results - and, obvi-
ously, a seat at the table so they can be closely involved in the govern-
ance of the nonprofit.
In order for donors to play this monitoring role, it is not enough for
the donor to be willing; the manager must be willing as well. The
donor cannot have a meaningful role unless the manager shares infor-
mation and, in some sense, authority as well. This cuts against the all-
too-human impulse to protect one's turf, but managers should realize
that they stand to benefit by tapping the donor's expertise. If this is
not motivation enough, they have another strong (and obvious) rea-
son as well: the need to raise money for their program.96 In my expe-
rience, the best way to raise money is to make potential donors feel
included. They appreciate time with nonprofit leaders-indeed, they
will insist on it-and they want to be heard. If the relationship grows
to the point where donors feel not only consulted, but in some sense
responsible, then their financial commitment will be reinforced
immeasurably.
Obviously, nonprofit managers do not have the time to provide this
sort of access to every donor. The average donor who writes a small
check will have little or no influence on the governance of the non-
96 Significant donors will be especially influential in organizations that depend most
heavily on donor financing, as opposed to fees charged to beneficiaries. But even if dona-
tions represent a relatively modest percentage of the overall operating budget, they still get
a manager's attention; even a 5% cut in the budget involves layoffs, program cuts, and
other unpleasant choices that nonprofit managers will prefer to avoid.
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profit-and, knowing this, they are unlikely to invest the time in-
volved in seeking this role-just as small shareholders have only
modest influence over a for-profit firm.97 Managers still want their
good will, since they have influence in the aggregate (again, just as
small shareholders do), but managers are more likely to view this
group as an audience for a communications strategy, rather than as a
governing body.
The most meaningful monitoring is done by a small cohort of do-
nors, who provide the most significant financial support. Again, there
is a clear analogy to for-profit firms, where large shareholders are best
positioned to monitor management, and the rest of the shareholders
piggyback on their efforts. Whether they have formal responsibilities
within the organization, such as a seat on the board of directors, is not
critical. Being on the board gives them some formal legal authority,
but the main source of their leverage-the real reason they can gain
access, influence policy, and, in some cases, effect a change in the
leadership-is their control of the purse strings. The influence comes
not so much from terms or conditions that the donor has imposed on
past gifts-although those, of course, can be important-but from the
possibility that a donor will make another gift. 98
In using this influence, donors often are motivated by idealistic im-
pulses, as noted above-after all, their financial support evidences a
personal commitment to the cause-but, in some cases, donor motiva-
tions will not be as pure. Self-dealing may be a concern. For example,
a donor might make a gift to a nonprofit and then suggest that, in
return, the nonprofit should purchase goods or services from her. Or
the donor may want special treatment from a nonprofit, such as
unique access to health care from a hospital or influence on admis-
sions from an academic institution.
A subtler concern arises when a significant donor has a different
substantive vision for the charity than other donors.99 For example,
assume that traditional donors to an advocacy group favor a litigation-
based approach, but a significant new donor uses her influence to pro-
mote media-based strategies and community education. Or assume
that traditional donors favor one substantive priority (for example,
land conservation) while the new donor favors another (for example,
global warming). If the new donor uses her influence to effect these
97 See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of
the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457, 470-71,
474-75 (1996).
98 Cf. Triantis, note 94, at 1147-53 (noting that donors have very limited formal power
and that restrictions on gifts are hard to enforce).
99 Triantis, note 94, at 1148.
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changes, other donors may feel that their views are not adequately
represented.
To sum up, then, a cohort of top donors can perform an important
monitoring function for nonprofits because these donors are likely to
have both the access and sophistication to evaluate whether goals are
being implemented effectively, and the influence to insist on changes,
if any are necessary. There are tradeoffs here-including the concern
that donors will overstep their advisory role or behave self-inter-
estedly-and these are challenges for the nonprofit manager to finesse
and, to an extent, for institutional design as well.
3. An Advantage of Nonprofits Over Government
Before turning to institutional design, it is worth emphasizing that
monitoring in governmental settings generally is quite different. Leg-
islators use hearings and studies to advise and monitor government
agencies, but government budgets are so large, and the range of public
goals is so vast, that legislators have only a passing knowledge of many
programs they fund. Organized interest groups and their lobbyists
may perform a monitoring role, but lobbyists are obviously much less
likely than charitable donors to focus on the public interest. As a
practical matter, individual voters are even less informed than legisla-
tors, and have only limited opportunities to vote "up or down" about
a given initiative.
Government programs also do not have the same access to expert
advice. Investment managers and entrepreneurs have rare skills, with
a correspondingly high pay scale that is well beyond what the govern-
ment pays employees. It is sometimes possible to attract people with
this level of expertise to serve in cabinet posts and in other senior
positions as political appointees. But given the size of the relevant
government bureaucracy, these senior officials typically will be farther
removed from programmatic details than their counterparts who ad-
vise nonprofits.
Of course, some government programs do have outside boards of
advisors, such as state hospitals or universities, or grant-awarding
agencies such as NIH. These sometimes offer expertise and monitor-
ing benefits that are comparable to those found in the nonprofit set-
ting, although much depends on context-specific factors such as the
composition of the board and the degree of influence it can exert. In
some cases it may be advisable to expand this model within the public
sector, although this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. The
main point here is that, unlike in government, the model has quite
broad application in the nonprofit sector, and this is a strength of sub-
sidized charity that has not attracted adequate attention.
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C. Institutional Design: Control and Distribution
How is institutional design affected if the priority is recruiting pri-
vate monitors, instead of encouraging generosity or reflecting prefer-
ences? This Section and the next consider the familiar criteria of
control, distribution, and structure.
To recruit monitors, we should let taxpayers support what they per-
sonally find most rewarding, so they are more likely to invest time as
well as money. In this respect, there is overlap with what we do to
encourage generosity and tension with a structure designed to reflect
a broader range of preferences.
Even so, we might still want to constrain donor choice in two ways.
The first is to create incentives to concentrate giving. If a donor gives
to fewer causes, she has more time to monitor each one, and will
devote more thought in choosing which to support. For example, if A
and B each plan to give $2 million to charity, and there are two poten-
tial donee organizations, it is probably better for A to give $2 million
to one and B to give $2 million to the other, instead of each making a
gift of $1 million to each charity. Either way, each charity gets the
same gift and, admittedly, A and B may feel somewhat less utility
from their giving (that is, if they otherwise would have divided their
giving), but the potential externalities from more careful monitoring
favor concentrated giving.
A second constraint on choice has to do with the form of the gift,
rather than the object: It may be better for donors to give spendable
money instead of endowments on the theory that spendable gifts en-
hance the donor's leverage. By making decisions one year at a time,
the donor makes an annual judgment about the quality of the non-
profit's efforts. With an endowment, in contrast, the donor has pro-
vided this cash flow in advance, and the effect is essentially
irrevocable. Although conditions can be placed on how the endow-
ment is used, it will be difficult for the donor to impose a condition
relating to the quality of the effort, since the condition is hard to spec-
ify, let alone to enforce. As a practical matter, the nonprofit has to
violate the condition quite blatantly in order to be legally vulnerable.
While there are thus reasons for the charitable subsidy to be more
generous in the case of spendable money, there are also arguments
that cut in the opposite direction. If the goal here is to piggyback on
private monitors, then we might think that these donors send an espe-
cially strong signal-one that is particularly worthy of a government
coinvestment-when they give an endowment gift. If they are willing
to surrender control in this way, they must have particular confidence
in the nonprofit's management. Of course, endowments are valuable
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on other dimensions too,100 something that further complicates the
question of whether to favor spendable money.
In any event, in deciding how much control taxpayers should have
to choose which charity they support, there is a tension between
recruiting monitors and reflecting preferences. A similar tension
arises in deciding how to distribute the subsidy. A subsidy structured
to recruit monitors will target high-income taxpayers, since only they
can give generously enough to influence nonprofit managers. While
such a subsidy also can encourage generosity, targeting wealthy do-
nors is not optimal for reflecting preferences, as noted above. Once
again, institutional design varies with the goal being pursued.
D. Institutional Design: Structure
To recruit private monitors, then, the subsidy should focus on high-
income donors, while encouraging concentrated giving and, perhaps,
spendable gifts as well. Yet whether or not we add these refinements,
the essential precondition for recruiting private monitors is, more fun-
damentally, to structure the subsidy as a match. This way, govern-
ment money is committed only if private individuals put up their own
money. Since individual donors have incentive to spend their own
money with care, the government can piggyback on these private
judgments without conducting an independent investigation. Obvi-
ously, the tax deduction under current law has this essential quality, as
do the other proposals explored in this Article. 10 1
Since all of these proposals involve donor monitoring, each one
presents the tradeoffs, discussed above, in relying on such monitoring.
Before considering further what refinements of institutional design
can mitigate these tradeoffs, it is worth emphasizing the vital role of
nonprofit managers in this regard. They need to (graciously) deflect
advice that is not valuable-and, indeed, to decline gifts that do not
advance the nonprofit's mission-while handling self-interested do-
nors with integrity and tact. Competition among nonprofits is helpful
100 Endowments facilitate long-range planning, and help to bridge timing differences so
that the donor can make a gift (for example, for tax reasons) before the nonprofit spends
the money. It is well known, for instance, that nonprofit needs tend to become more acute
during economic downturns, when donor capacity is likely to decline. See Triantis, note 94,
at 1146.
101 Although the focus of this Article is the income tax, it is worth noting that the analy-
sis here may apply to the gift tax, but generally does not apply to the estate tax. Obviously,
once the donor has passed away, she cannot serve as an advisor and monitor. At best, she
can "pre-monitor" by making a careful investigation of the charity while she is alive. Do-
nor monitoring might serve as a rationale, then, for the transfer tax system to favor inter
vivos giving over bequests, a point that is underexplored in the literature on the subject. In
any event, a detailed exploration of the estate and gift tax is beyond this Article's scope.
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here, since nonprofits whose donors offer constructive monitoring and
input are likely to outperform their peers.
There also may be a role for the tax law, which can be refined to
enhance monitoring in three ways: first, by flagging issues on which
donor monitoring is particularly important; second, by rewarding es-
pecially active monitors; and third, by requiring disclosure about who
the most significant donors are to each charity, so that other donors
know who the relevant monitors are in evaluating a given charity.
1. Flagging Issues
First, the tax law can encourage donors to focus on issues that are of
special concern. For instance, charities should not devote excessive
resources to overhead or fundraising, since these expenses divert re-
sources from the charity's core mission. The tax law can focus donor
attention on this issue by denying the tax benefit, or a portion of it,
when charities devote too large a percentage of their budgets to these
noncore expenses. With this sort of rule, the tax law can motivate
donors, who care about the tax benefit, to pressure charities to be
more efficient.
This approach has its share of difficulties, though. It is hard to pro-
mulgate standards that are appropriate for all charities-on the
proper level of overhead and fundraising, as well as on other issues. It
is unlikely that "one size fits all" rules will be sensible in every con-
text, especially as conditions change over time. Charities also will be
motivated to recharacterize their activities in order to provide more
generous tax benefits. Fundraising expense will be reclassified as "ed-
ucational expense," and the like.
2. Rewarding Effective Monitors
An alternative strategy is to reward especially good monitors. This
approach seems more promising than focusing on particular issues, al-
though it too increases administrative costs. There are three different
factors that the regime can consider to identify especially active
monitors.
First, how sophisticated is the donor? As noted above, venture cap-
italists, entrepreneurs, investment bankers, and other professionals
have valuable expertise they can lend to a nonprofit. In theory, the
tax law can condition the size of the subsidy on the donor's education
or professional experience, rewarding those who are in a position to
provide sophisticated advice. Yet this is an imperfect way to measure
what a donor has to offer. For example, someone who focuses on phi-
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lanthropy full-time may make a greater nonmonetary contribution
than someone whose professional obligations are all-consuming.
A second factor, which is more objective, is to focus on the size of
the gift as a way of measuring how much the donor will care about it,
and how much influence the gift will have with the nonprofit. In mea-
suring how much the donor has at stake, the system can measure the
gift as a percentage both of the donor's income and of her overall
giving (with the latter inquiry obviously encouraging concentrated giv-
ing). After all, a gift of $500,000 is less significant to someone giving
away $10 million than to someone giving away $600,000. In focusing
on size, the system also has to measure the percentage the gift repre-
sents of a nonprofit's budget. A gift of $25,000 is large enough to
influence a charity with a $100,000 annual budget, but not a $100 mil-
lion budget. In this spirit, a gift that represents more than a minimum
percentage of the taxpayer's income, the taxpayer's giving, and also
the annual charity's fundraising can earn the donor an extra "govern-
ance" subsidy.
Yet there obviously are complexities here, which may not be worth
the effort. For example, a charity might have the incentive to split
itself into multiple charities, so that each gift would seem like a more
substantial percentage of its fundraising; in response, rules would be
needed to aggregate these numbers. Likewise, donors would face
some uncertainty about whether their gift is large enough, given un-
certainties about a charity's fundraising in a given year, although this
concern could be addressed by looking to the prior year instead of the
current year.
A third factor for measuring whether a donor is providing advice
and monitoring-and thus whether she should earn an extra govern-
ance-based tax benefit-is to ask whether she has a formal govern-
ance role, such as membership on the board of directors. A possible
concern about this idea is that it is overinclusive, since it could lead to
a proliferation of advisory boards that do not have a real role, existing
solely to justify this tax benefit. To address this concern, the system
would need a set of requirements that are hard to fudge. For example,
the tax benefit can be conditioned on attending a minimum number of
meetings, on having access to confidential information, and on having
meaningful input on personnel issues, including the tenure of the non-
profit's senior managers. In addition, a limit would be needed on the
number of advisors that a nonprofit (and related affiliates) can have.
A complicating dynamic here is that this rule would empower non-
profit managers to give donors something of value-a ticket to a more
generous tax benefit. We might worry about making donors depen-
dent on a nonprofit manager's good will, since this dependence may
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undercut a donor's ability to discipline the nonprofit, thereby defeat-
ing the purpose of the proposal. Given the important role that donors
have in providing funding, though, it is hard to picture them losing
much of this leverage.
Perhaps a more telling objection to this proposal (and others like it)
is that it is unnecessary. The real source of influence that donors have
is not formal authority, but the power of the purse. The larger the gift,
the more influence the donor has. It is not clear that the government
needs to provide an extra tax benefit to donors who have a formal
governance role, since a similar effect arises-at lower administrative
cost -in a basic matching program. As long as bigger gifts generally
command bigger government matches (something that is already true
under current law), the government can rely on the donors' own in-
centives to watch how their money is used.
3. Disclosure About Most Significant Donors
Given the influence that significant donors can exert in advising and
disciplining nonprofits, we obviously want that influence to be used
wisely. It stands to reason that some donors are better monitors than
others. It may be valuable, then, to create a means to monitor the
monitors. In this spirit, nonprofits can be required to offer more dis-
closure about their most significant donors (with special rules for
trusts, such that the trustee and the donor to the trust are both identi-
fied). If the donors have strong reputations-if they are known to
give good advice, not to seek preferential treatment, and the like-
then the charity will draw strength from its association with these do-
nors. Just like some investors are more inclined to invest in a firm
once Warren Buffet has done so, some donors will piggyback on the
charitable judgments of well-respected philanthropists. Likewise, if a
donor has a problematic reputation, then other donors will be more
wary of the charity, and will want to ask more questions about
whether the donor is exerting undue influence.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article considers why we should pursue public goals with sub-
sidized charity, rather than using the many other policy instruments at
our disposal, and offers three separate reasons, all rooted in problems
of information and incentives: first, to encourage donors to be more
generous; second, to measure and reflect popular preferences aboilt
which public goals to pursue; and third, to recruit private monitors.
This Article uncovers a series of tradeoffs inherent in subsidizing
charitable contributions. Although funding that is given voluntarily
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comes at lower social cost, there is rarely enough. A decentralized
process for funding public goals allows for competition and experi-
mentation, but lacks coordination. It also empowers minorities, but
gives disproportionate influence to wealthy donors. These wealthy
donors have the influence and, in some cases, the expertise to be ef-
fective monitors, but who will monitor them if they overstep their ex-
pertise or behave self-interestedly?
These tradeoffs can be resolved any number of ways, and the pre-
cise institutional design we choose depends on our priorities. If our
goal is to encourage generosity-and thus to increase the supply of
voluntarily-provided (and, hence, low social cost) funding for public
goals-we should focus the subsidy on wealthy donors, who are most
tax sensitive. We should place only minimal limits on their ability to
choose which causes to support, and we should focus the subsidy on
contributions that are marginal. Recruiting these wealthy donors as
monitors is largely compatible with this agenda. We should create in-
centives for them to concentrate their giving and invest time.
Yet this agenda obviously will be less successful at reflecting popu-
lar preferences, since the charitable priorities of wealthy people are
not fully representative. How, then, can we ensure that every else's
preferences are also satisfied? One possibility is to look to govern-
ment programs, instead of subsidized charity, to ensure representa-
tiveness. In effect, we would look to subsidized charity to encourage
generosity and to recruit private monitoring, while leaving it to other
policy instruments to advance goals that wealthy donors are not inter-
ested in pursuing through philanthropy. This is the approach that I
would follow, but others can reasonably take a different view.
If subsidized charity must itself be more representative, the agenda
described above can be modified in ways small and large, depending
on how willing we are to sacrifice success at encouraging generosity
and recruiting private monitors. Participation requirements are a rel-
atively modest adjustment. At the other end of the spectrum, we can
mine the preferences of low-income taxpayers with a check-off system
(or an extra- generous match), while capping the subsidized contribu-
tions of wealthy donors and constraining their ability to choose which
causes to support. The balance we strike depends, ultimately, on the
values we seek to pursue. Yet even then, thoughtful institutional de-
sign can help us negotiate these tradeoffs more effectively.
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